Kleinfeldt v. Crossroads Repair

A. Diversity Jurisdiction and the Erie Doctrine

Jurisdiction rests solely on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The docket confirms that characterization: the cause of action is identified as “28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury,” the nature of suit is “360 P.I.: Other,” and jurisdiction is listed as “Diversity.” No federal-question claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 has been pleaded, and none is available on these facts. A federal court sitting in diversity applies state substantive law and federal procedural law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652. As stated by the Supreme Court, “there is no federal general common law.” Duty, breach, causation, comparative fault, damages, and immunities are substantive. Accordingly, North Dakota law, or Wyoming law as selected under North Dakota’s choice-of-law rules, governs those issues. The diversity court applies the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). That principle requires the Court to apply North Dakota’s significant-contacts analysis, discussed in Part VI.D below, to determine whether North Dakota or Wyoming substantive law controls particular issues.

B. No Private Right of Action Under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act

The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5128, and the implementing regulations in 49 C.F.R. Parts 171 through 180, create no private federal cause of action. Borough of Ridgefield v. N.Y. Susquehanna & W. R.R., 810 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1987); Clark v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 944 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1991). A plaintiff cannot sue “under” those regulations. Incorporating the Act into a state negligence action to establish the standard of care is likewise insufficient to create federal-question jurisdiction. Cabana v. Forcier, 148 F. Supp. 2d 110, 118 (D. Mass. 2001). The federal regulations therefore perform a limited but important role. They supply the substantive standard of care within a state-law negligence or negligent-undertaking claim. They do not themselves create a freestanding federal cause of action. Federal procedure, including Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 19 through 21, and federal jurisdictional rules, including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1367(b) and the citizenship rules of Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378 (2016), and Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990), also apply. Section 1447(e) does not apply, because this action was originally filed in federal court and was not removed. Pleading a stand-alone claim under the Act or the regulations would invite dismissal and would risk the case’s only jurisdictional footing. The stronger course is a carefully pleaded state-law tort structure that uses the federal cargo-tank regulations as the measure of reasonable care.

C. Two Findings That Reframe Strategy

Two verified propositions of North Dakota law should drive every strategic decision that follows. First, North Dakota imposes several-only liability. Under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, the fact-finder must allocate fault among “each person, whether or not a party,” and each defendant is “liable only for the

amount of damages attributable to the percentage of fault of that party.” With Crossroads as the sole defendant, every percentage of fault assigned to an empty chair—the truck’s owner, the person who installed the nonconforming valve, the servicer who left the vapor vent clogged, or Mr. Kleinfeldt himself—is fault that Plaintiff cannot collect from anyone. That empty-chair risk is the single most important structural weakness in the case as currently pleaded. Wyoming likewise abolished joint and several liability. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(e). The empty-chair problem therefore persists under either state’s law. Second, North Dakota does not recognize negligence per se. A statutory or regulatory violation is evidence of negligence only. Ebach v. Ralston, 510 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1994); Simon v. Woodland, 179 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1970). The Eighth Circuit has applied that rule in diversity. The Complaint’s reliance on 49 C.F.R. violations therefore does not establish liability as a matter of law if North Dakota law governs. Those violations must be paired with a coherent duty theory and expert proof of causation. The case should therefore be rebuilt around two pillars: 1) joinder of every responsible actor whose fault is likely to appear on the verdict form; and 2) a negligent-undertaking theory under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, with the federal regulations used as powerful evidence of the standard of care rather than as an automatic-liability shortcut.

A. The VIN and Model-Year Discrepancy

In a seventeen-character VIN, position ten encodes the model year. The digit “7” in that position denotes model year 2007. Model year 1997 is encoded by the letter “V.” The VIN pleaded in the Complaint, 1NKWXBEX670185231, has “7” in position ten and therefore decodes to model year 2007, not 1997. The world manufacturer identifier “1NK” identifies Kenworth, a PACCAR marque assembled in the United States, which is consistent with a Kenworth power unit. Separately, the VIN as written fails the FMVSS 565 check-digit algorithm. The computed check digit is 9, but position nine of the pleaded VIN is 6. A VIN that passed the check-digit test would read 1NKWXBEX970185231. The pleaded VIN is therefore either mis-transcribed or not a genuine VIN as written. This discrepancy is primarily a credibility and vehicle-identity problem. It does not change the substantive inspection standard, because § 180.407 keys the criteria to the tank’s specification plate, which the inspector reads on site regardless of the tractor’s age. A defense argument that the inspector applied different criteria because the unit was treated as a 2007 vehicle is legally weak. If the truck is in fact a 2007 unit rather than a 1997 unit, that fact also undercuts any narrative that the defects were the excusable product of an ancient vehicle. The discrepancy nonetheless creates three risks that counsel should neutralize: a Rule 11 or accuracy attack on a facially invalid VIN; a vehicle-identity dispute in which the defense argues that the inspection records pertain to a different unit or tank; and impeachment of the rigor of Plaintiff’s investigation generally.

Counsel should obtain the certificate of title and an NMVTIS or NHTSA decode; the cargo tank’s specification or data plate; and Crossroads’s inspection records under § 180.417(b) for January 5, 2023, and January 23, 2024. Counsel should then correct the VIN in any amended pleading and, where appropriate, plead the tank’s specification separately from the tractor.

B. Several Liability and the Empty-Chair Problem

This is the most important weakness in the current pleading, and the Answer confirmed that Crossroads intends to exploit it. Under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-02, liability is several only. The jury allocates fault to every contributing person, whether or not a party, and each defendant pays only its own share. Crossroads affirmatively alleges that any damages were caused by the fault of “third persons” over whom it had no control, Answer ¶ 15; that Plaintiff failed to join necessary or indispensable parties, Answer ¶ 10; that Plaintiff’s own fault bars or reduces recovery under North Dakota’s comparative-fault statute, Answer ¶¶ 13–14; and that an intervening or superseding cause breaks the chain of causation, Answer ¶ 16. Those pleadings are not boilerplate noise. They are a roadmap of the empty-chair trial Crossroads will try if the case remains single-defendant. Two consequences follow. First, if Crossroads is the lone defendant and the jury attributes fault to the owner, the valve installer, the vent servicer, and Mr. Kleinfeldt, Plaintiff recovers nothing for those shares. Crossroads will have every incentive to run an aggressive empty-chair defense, because the statute rewards that strategy. Second, Plaintiff’s recovery is barred entirely if his fault “was as great as the combined fault of all other persons who contribute to the injury.” Spreading responsibility across additional defendants reduces the relative percentage the defense can assign to Mr. Kleinfeldt and lowers the risk of crossing that bar. Joining the other responsible actors is therefore not merely a search for deeper pockets. It converts allocated fault into a collectible judgment, protects against the comparative-fault bar, and answers the Rule 19 defense Crossroads has already preserved. The July 17 mid-discovery conference underscores the same point: Plaintiff’s counsel told the Court that settlement discussions may be possible after third-party discovery is received, and the Court held discussion “regarding third parties.” Doc. 16. Third-party discovery and third-party joinder are now the same strategic project, and both must be advanced before August 14, 2026. One open question remains. North Dakota’s statute directs allocation of fault to “each person, whether or not a party.” Whether a workers’-compensation-immune employer’s fault may be placed on the verdict form as an empty chair, even though contribution from that employer is generally unavailable, should be researched promptly. If immune-employer fault can appear on the form, that share is uncollectible under several liability and supplies an independent reason to develop non-employer defendants and to consider forum alternatives.

C. Choice of Law

The injury occurred in Wyoming. The inspection and the named defendant are in North Dakota. The truck owner is in Wyoming. Plaintiff has disclosed South Dakota citizenship. Doc. 10. A federal court sitting in diversity applies North Dakota’s choice-of-law rules.

North Dakota has abandoned lex loci delicti and applies a significant-contacts test using Leflar’s¹ five choice-influencing considerations: predictability of results, maintenance of interstate order, simplification of the judicial task, advancement of the forum’s governmental interests, and application of the better rule of law. Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972). The place of injury is a contact, but it is not automatically controlling. In Issendorf itself, the court applied North Dakota law despite an out-of-state accident. The two states diverge on issues that matter in this case. North Dakota treats a regulatory violation as evidence of negligence only. Wyoming permits the court to adopt a regulation as the standard of care under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 286 through 288C; if adopted, an unexcused violation is negligence in itself. Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981); Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1987); Frost v. Allred, 2006 WY 155, 148 P.3d 17. Both states impose modified comparative fault and several liability, though the comparative-fault bar is framed differently: North Dakota bars recovery if the plaintiff’s fault is as great as the combined fault of all others, while Wyoming bars recovery if the claimant’s fault exceeds fifty percent of total fault. Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109(b), (e). North Dakota requires a post-filing motion to amend before exemplary damages may be sought and caps those damages at twice compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-11. Wyoming permits exemplary damages for willful and wanton misconduct and has no statutory tort damages cap. Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4(a). The personal-injury limitations period is six years in North Dakota and four years in Wyoming. N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(5); Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C). On the standard-of-care question, Wyoming law is arguably more favorable, because it permits the court to treat the federal regulations as the very standard of care. Counsel should brief the Issendorf analysis deliberately, decide which state’s law helps most on each issue, and plead and instruct accordingly. Choice of law should not be left for the defense to frame.

D. Under-Pleaded Theories of Liability

The Complaint pleads one generic negligence count. It should be expanded. The strongest theory against the inspector is negligent undertaking under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. North Dakota has adopted that section. Madler v. McKenzie County, 467 N.W.2d 709 (N.D. 1991), aff’d after remand, 496 N.W.2d 17 (N.D. 1993); see also Patch v. Sebelius, 349 N.W.2d 637 (N.D. 1984). Section 324A imposes liability on one who undertakes, for consideration, to render services that the actor should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person, where the failure to use reasonable care increased the risk of harm, the actor undertook a duty owed by another to the third person, or the harm resulted from reliance on the undertaking. All three prongs fit Crossroads. Passing an unsafe tank increased the risk that the tank would remain in service. Crossroads undertook the owner’s or carrier’s federal inspection duty. The owner and driver relied on the passing inspection to keep the truck in service. That theory supplies the duty element that a bare negligence count leaves exposed. Counsel should not over-rely on Sayler v. Holstrom, 239 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1976). That appeal decided only an indemnity claim by the inspector against the employer; it did not affirm a worker’s negligence claim against the inspector.

Counsel should retain the common-law negligence count but expressly frame 49 C.F.R. §§ 171.8, 178.345-5, 180.407, 180.409, and 180.417 as evidence of the applicable standard of care under North Dakota law and, in the alternative, as the adopted standard of care under Wyoming law. Both theories should be supported by a cargo-tank inspection expert. Products-liability claims against the component or tank manufacturers and installers are also available on these facts. The wrong 36-PSI relief valve on a 25-PSI tank and the manhole cover lacking the § 178.345-5(c) safety device are classic defect allegations. Former N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-03, which provided pure comparative fault for product-liability actions, was repealed in 1993. Product liability is now included in the modified and several-only regime of § 32-03.2-02. Joining manufacturers remains critical for collectibility under several liability, not because products receive a freer comparative-fault rule. The file identifies Polar Tank Trailer of Holdingford, Minnesota, as a probable manufacturer or warranty servicer. Counsel should investigate the chain from manufacturer to up-fitter or installer to the servicer who fitted the nonconforming valve. A spousal loss-of-consortium claim for Porshia Kleinfeldt should be evaluated and, if viable, added, with attention to its effect on diversity. Child loss-of-parental-consortium for a nonfatal injury is not available under North Dakota law. Butz v. World Wide, Inc., 492 N.W.2d 88 (N.D. 1992); Morgel v. Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1980).

E. Workers’-Compensation Exclusivity

The § 27-14-105 recital strongly indicates that Mr. Kleinfeldt was a covered Wyoming worker, almost certainly of M&K Oil. That fact explains the omission of M&K as a defendant. Under Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-104(a), a contributing employer’s workers’-compensation coverage is “in lieu of all other rights and remedies,” rendering the employer immune from suit by an injured employee. SOS Staffing Servs., Inc. v. Fields, 2002 WY 141, 54 P.3d 761. Co-employees are immune unless they “intentionally act to cause physical harm,” a standard the Wyoming Supreme Court equates with willful and wanton misconduct. Hannifan v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Cheyenne, 2008 WY 65, 185 P.3d 679. Three workarounds warrant investigation. First, counsel should determine whether M&K was in fact the employer and whether it was contributing. If a separate staffing entity or affiliate employed Mr. Kleinfeldt, M&K may be an “other person” amenable to suit under the SOS Staffing analysis. SOS Staffing Services, Inc. v. Fields, 2002 WY 141, 54 P.3d 761 (Wyo. 2002). If M&K failed to secure or maintain coverage, immunity is forfeited under § 27-14-104(c). Second, even if M&K is an immune employer, its independent capacity as owner of a DOT cargo tank matters for empty-chair allocation and for identifying non-immune servicers and suppliers. Third, any recovery is subject to the State of Wyoming’s reimbursement right under § 27-14-105, capped at one-third of proceeds and reduced pro rata for fees and costs. That lien should be built into settlement modeling now.

F. Damages Sequencing and Drafting Defects

North Dakota prohibits pleading exemplary damages in the initial complaint. A party must later move to amend, supported by affidavits or deposition testimony, and the court grants leave only if the evidence could support a finding of oppression, fraud, or malice. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-11. The cap is twice compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is greater. The Complaint’s omission of punitive damages

is therefore procedurally correct. Counsel should build the record in discovery and calendar the motion to amend.

G. The Answer: Admissions, Denials, and Affirmative Defenses.

The Answer, Doc. 4, filed February 24, 2026, is the first formal statement of Crossroads’s litigation posture. It should be treated as both a liability admission record and a defense roadmap. The admissions are material. Crossroads admits Complaint Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 8, thereby admitting that it is a North Dakota limited liability company with its principal place of business at 8060 36th Street SE, Jamestown; that Curtis J. Waldie is its registered agent; that it is a registered DOT third-party cargo-tank inspector under CT Number 14175; and that, upon information and belief as pleaded, Justin Heidt was its Tank Inspector Supervisor. Answer ¶ 5; Compl. ¶¶ 4–6, 8. Crossroads admits that Plaintiff was injured on or about May 2, 2024. Answer ¶ 1. Most importantly for duty, Crossroads “specifically admits it was a registered inspector that performed an inspection on the vehicle in question.” Answer ¶ 8. Those admissions eliminate any serious dispute that Crossroads undertook the Registered Inspector function with respect to the subject tank truck. They should be pleaded as admissions in any amended complaint and used as Rule 36 requests for admission and Rule 56 undiputed facts. The denials define the proof battle. Crossroads specifically denies Complaint Paragraphs 56, 58, 65, 66, and 67—the heart of the inspection-failure and negligence allegations—and asserts a general denial of all unadmitted claims. Answer ¶¶ 1–2. It claims insufficient information as to nearly the entire May 2 narrative, the PSC Custom findings, and Plaintiff’s medical and damages allegations, and it places Plaintiff on his proof. Answer ¶¶ 1, 4, 23. It characterizes many paragraphs as “legal assertions” that need not be admitted or denied. Answer ¶ 7. Those positions underscore the need for early Rule 30(b)(6) testimony on inspection procedures, training, and the 2023 and 2024 inspection files, together with third-party discovery from M&K Oil, PSC Custom, and any investigating agency. The affirmative defenses track North Dakota’s several-liability and comparative-fault scheme and must be answered strategically, not merely denied. Crossroads pleads Plaintiff’s own fault under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-01 and asserts that Plaintiff’s fault equals or exceeds Crossroads’s fault so as to bar recovery. Answer ¶¶ 13–14. It pleads the fault of uncontrolled third persons, Answer ¶ 15; efficient intervening or superseding cause, Answer ¶ 16; reasonable care and compliance with the applicable standard, Answer ¶¶ 17–18; ratification or acquiescence by Plaintiff or his employer, Answer ¶ 19; limitation or preemption by workers’-compensation laws, Answer ¶ 20; spoliation of evidence, Answer ¶ 21; collateral-source reduction under Chapter 32-03.2, Answer ¶ 22; failure to mitigate and pre-existing or subsequent injuries, Answer ¶ 23; and statute of limitations, statute of repose, laches, and unclean hands, Answer ¶ 24. It also preserves defenses under Rules 8, 9, 12, and 19. Answer ¶¶ 9–12, 25. Several of those defenses have verified legal content that counsel should anticipate now. The comparative-fault and third-person-fault defenses are grounded in N.D.C.C. §§ 32-03.2-01 and 32-03.2-02 and reinforce the joinder imperative discussed above. The collateral-source defense correctly invokes the post-verdict reduction mechanism of N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-06, which permits reduction of economic damages for qualifying collateral-source payments that need not be repaid, but excludes benefits purchased by the injured party; the jury is not to be informed of that potential reduction. N.D.C.C. § 32-03.2-10. Workers’-compensation “preemption” does not bar a tort suit against a third-party inspector; at

most it frames the employer’s immunity and the State’s reimbursement interest under Wyoming’s Workers’ Compensation Act, discussed in Part VI.F. The limitations and repose defenses appear weak on the present record: the injury occurred on May 2, 2024, and suit was filed January 30, 2026, well within North Dakota’s six-year and Wyoming’s four-year personal-injury periods. The spoliation defense is fact-dependent and is addressed with the discovery posture below. Procedurally, Crossroads demands a jury of nine under Rule 38. Answer at 5. Both sides have demanded a jury, and Doc. 13 confirms that trial will be to a jury. Counsel should assume a Fargo jury trial of approximately ten days beginning August 17, 2027, as noticed in Docs. 14 and 15, and should build the amended pleading and discovery plan to that audience and calendar.

H. Discovery Posture, Preservation, and the Third-Party Timeline.

The Joint Scheduling/Discovery Plan, adopted with modifications as the Court’s Scheduling Order, Doc. 13, is as important strategically as the Answer. The parties expressly agreed that discovery would cover not only Crossroads’s inspections, procedures, training, and Registered Inspector certifications under 49 C.F.R. Parts 178 and 180, but also inspections and work performed by Plaintiff, his employer, or any other person or entity; PSC Custom’s May 10, 2024 inspection; and inspections or investigations by OSHA, workers’-compensation carriers, and law enforcement. Doc. 13 at 2–3. That agreed scope is a judicially adopted map of the empty chairs. It also supplies the foundation for third-party subpoenas that should be served immediately if they have not already been served. On preservation, Plaintiff reported no known issues. Defendant stated that it “does not know the location of the vehicle or trailers involved in the accident and whether they have been preserved,” and it “reserves the right to claim lack of preservation if the facts and circumstances warrant it.” Doc. 13 at 4. The Answer converts that reservation into an affirmative spoliation defense alleging that Plaintiff allowed relevant evidence to be destroyed despite a duty to preserve it. Answer ¶ 21. Counsel should immediately document the chain of custody for the truck, pup trailer, pressure relief valve, vapor vent, pressure gauge, and manhole assembly; confirm litigation holds to M&K Oil, PSC Custom, and any storage facility; and propose a joint inspection protocol. If Crossroads itself never sought the vehicle after learning of the claim, its spoliation narrative is vulnerable; if the components were altered or disposed of after Plaintiff’s counsel was involved, the defense will be used aggressively at trial and in motions in limine. Medical-records discovery remains unresolved. Plaintiff will request, redact, and produce discoverable medical and related records and will not provide executed authorizations; Defendant prefers releases and requested the Court’s guidance. Doc. 13 at 5; Doc. 12. That dispute does not alter the liability strategy, but counsel should be prepared to defend the redaction-and-production approach and to produce a complete, well-organized medical file that undercuts any mitigation or pre-existing-injury theme pleaded in Answer ¶ 23. The operative deadlines, as modified by the Court in Doc. 13, are as follows: join additional parties and amend pleadings by August 14, 2026; complete fact discovery by September 25, 2026; file discovery motions by October 9, 2026; serve Plaintiff’s expert reports by November 6, 2026; serve Defendant’s expert reports by December 4, 2026; serve rebuttal expert disclosures by January 8, 2027; and complete expert depositions and file dispositive motions by January 30, 2027. The final pretrial conference is set for August 3, 2027, with jury trial noticed for August 17, 2027, for an estimated ten days. Docs. 13–15.

The Court has already reminded the parties that deadlines can be adjusted and that a court-hosted settlement conference remains available. Docs. 12, 16. Counsel should not rely on a later schedule adjustment to excuse missing the August 14 joinder deadline. The July 17, 2026 mid-discovery status conference is the most recent judicial snapshot of the case. Plaintiff’s counsel reported no present need to adjust the schedule and stated that settlement discussion may be possible after third-party discovery is received. Discussion was held regarding third parties. Defense counsel agreed and noted that deadlines may need adjustment later. Doc. 16. That exchange is double-edged. It shows that both sides already recognize that nonparties—almost certainly including the employer and other inspectors or servicers—are central to valuation and fault allocation. It also shows that Plaintiff’s current posture is discovery-first, settlement-second. In a several-liability regime, discovery-first is correct only if it produces timely joinder. With the join-and-amend deadline approximately three weeks after the conference, counsel should treat every outstanding third-party subpoena as an August 14 problem, not merely a September 25 discovery problem.